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 THE INTERPRETATION(S) OF PREDICATION
Uwe Meixner
ABSTRACT
In the course of the history of Western philosophy, various philosophers have given 
various answers to the question of the ontological basis of predication. This essay presents the 
main, the crucial answers: the paradigms and theories of predication of the Sophists (and of all 
later radical relativists), of Plato, of Aristotle, of the Aristotelian-minded non-nominalists, of 
Leibniz, and of Frege. The essay follows (to some extent) the most infl uential – the Aristotelian 
or quasi-mereological – paradigm of predication in its continuity and modifi cation through the 
many centuries of its reign. But this essay is not content to adopt the merely historical point 
of view; it also poses the question of adequacy. Prior to Frege, a philosophically satisfactory 
theory of predication was not even in the offi  ng, and the essay points out the shortcomings 
(besides aspects that can be viewed as advantages) of each pre-Fregean predication-theory 
it considers. Frege, in the 19th century, brought the philosophy of predication on the right 
track. But his own theory of predication has its own defi cits (which it shares with still other 
predication-theories). The essay ends with the presentation of a theory of predication that 
the author himself considers adequate.
In the economy of science, and of knowledge in general, simple predicative 
statements have a fundamental and indispensable role to play. Such statements, 
simple as they are: containing no logical functors, have various forms in natural 
language. Here is a far-from-complete list of such forms, each item in the list 
combined with an illustrative example:
Forms Examples
α Φs [covering also: α is] Kate laughs
α is Φ Kate is beautiful
α is a Φ Kate is an actress
α Ψs β [covering also: α is β] Kate loves George
α is+pr β Kate is in Boston
α is Φ+pr β Kate is married to George
α is a Φ+pr β William is a descendant of Albert
α is+pr β and γ The tree is between the house and the street
[pr: some preposition]
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Notwithstanding these many forms, the general form of simple predicative state-
ments, which is familiar from fi rst-order predicate logic, is just this:
Φ(α1, …, αN)
Here the sequence “α1, …, αN” represents the occurrences of the singular terms 
in a simple predicative statement, all of them without syntactical structure, in 
the order in which they follow each other in the statement (noting that a singular 
term may occur more than once in it); and the letter “Φ” represents the rest 
of the statement: the predicative basis, devoid of all logical functors, in which all 
of the occurrences of singular terms in the statement are embedded; fi nally, 
the unifying function of the predicative basis is indicated by the embracing 
brackets, “(” and “)”. In order to make matters as simple as possible – that is: in 
order to focus on the basic problem of predication – I stipulate, in addition to the 
description of simple predicative statements just given, that the singular terms 
in simple predicative statements are not to refer to linguistic items or abstract 
entities, and that the predicates in simple predicative statements are to be chosen 
accordingly.
Some simple predicative statements are true. But from the earliest times of 
philosophy to this day the nature of the truth of true simple predicative state-
ments has been controversial among the philosophers. Does the truth of such 
statements have ontological import? And if it has ontological import, what exactly 
is that import? These questions are philosophical evergreens, and not accidentally 
so: their importance can hardly be overestimated. For what is at stake in these 
questions is nothing less than the basic determination on what it truly amounts 
to when we claim to have knowledge of the world and to speak the truth about the 
world. In this essay, I shall look at some of the milestones of a discussion that spans 
almost 25 centuries: among other predication-theories, at the theories of Plato, 
Aristotle, and the Aristotelian-minded non-nominalists, at the theories of Leibniz 
and of Frege. At the end of the essay, I shall briefl y present my own approach.
The positions on predication of the just-mentioned philosophers – diff erent as 
they are – have at least one thing in common: all of them are opposed to the view 
that simple predicative statements have no ontological import at all. According 
to the no-ontological-import view, if a simple predicative statement is true, then 
its truth is a product merely of social convention, and hence a product merely of 
the allocation of power in the relevant group of speakers, since social convention 
follows social power. This view – the conviction that social convention, social 
power are the basic truthmakers, that basic truth itself is a social construction 
– was present at the beginning of philosophy in the teachings of the Sophists, it 
unmistakably shines through the voluntarism of mediaeval nominalists, and it 
reappears recognizably in the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein.1
1  Signifi cantly, Wittgenstein says the following in the Philosophical Investi gations (§ 381): 
“How do I know that this colour is red? – It would be an answer to say: ‘I have learnt English’.”
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Put formally, that is: in the most general way, the described view is this:
Social conventionalism in predication-theory:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to the following: α1, …, αN 
is purely on the basis of social convention designated by the general term “Φ”.
Hence, for the special case of non-relational predications: 
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to the following: α is purely on 
the basis of social convention designated by the general term “Φ”.
If this were true, then the following instantiation of this general schema would 
have to be true, too:
“Kate is a woman” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to the following: Kate 
is purely on the basis of social convention designated by the general term “woman”.
Now, this does not seem to be true; for, while it is true that Kate is a woman, it is 
hard to believe that Kate is purely on the basis of social convention designated by the 
general term “woman”.
On the other hand, I can to some extent understand it – psychologi cally – if 
social conventionalism in predication-theory is adopted as a weapon against 
classifi cations that are, one feels, merely socio-conven tionally based but masque-
rade as hard and objective, ontologically based truths. One may be prompted by the 
– hardly rational – implicit belief that the charge “Mere convention!”, if advanced 
against such classifi  cations, can only be truly eff ective in one’s mouth if one 
has managed to convince oneself of its being true for all classifi cations that are 
generally thought to be true.
A fundamental attitude of protest against established social power – mere power, 
but manifesting itself, the protester believes, in disguise: in simple predicative 
statements that rather persuasively pretend to express incontrovertible objective 
facts – may be something that modern feminist philosophers2 have in common 
with the ancient Sophists. The prime target of the Sophists, however, were not 
simple predicative statements expressing what is generally regarded to be natural 
facts, but simple predicative statements expressing what is generally regarded to 
be axiological facts, statements like “This decision is just”, or “That deed is cou-
rageous”, where everyone in the community, on being informed of the relevant 
circumstances, feels compelled to say, “Yes, that’s true”. Nevertheless, it is total, 
unrestricted social conventionalism in predication-theory which, very plausibly, 
underlies the famous homo-mensura-dictum of the Sophist Protagoras, according 
to which “man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, 
and of the things that are not, that they are not”. Applying the homo-mensura-
dictum to axiological statements, one can very well declare that “This decision is 
just” and “This deed is courageous” are true (in the relevant circumstances) – “as 
2  For example (and paradigmatically), Judith Butler.
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everybody says they are”; but one will add that all that is implied by these truths 
is this: the mentioned decision is purely on the basis of social convention designated 
by the term “just”, and the mentioned deed is purely on the basis of social convention 
designated by the term “courageous”; for man – in another word: society, in other 
words: the social group which is in power – is the measure of all things.
It was this utterly subversive attitude that Plato, following Socrates, was re-
act ing against. His philosophically most signifi cant move in this was to off er 
a predication-theory which is not conventionalistic. Showing full aware ness 
of the problem of predication, Plato came up with the fi rst explicitly formu lated 
pre di cation-theory ever. Now, Plato, in the course of his career as a philosopher, 
under went substantial development in his thinking about predication, and in fact, 
in later phases, became critical of earlier positions of his. But this did not hinder 
that the predication-theory that is imposingly present in the dialogues from the 
middle of Plato’s career – in the Symposium, the Phaedo, the Republic – had a massive 
eff ect on the history of ideas. Very soberly – quite without the poetic splendour 
of philosophical mythology – that predication-theory can be formulated in the 
following way (and Plato himself formulates it that way in Parm., 132 d 1–5):
Plato’s (classical) predication-theory:
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to this: α is suffi  ciently similar to 
the Φ itself.
Applying this theory, we get for example:
“This deed is just” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: this 
deed is suffi  ciently similar to the just itself.
“Kate is beautiful” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: Kate 
is suffi  ciently similar to the beautiful itself.
“Kate is a woman” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: Kate 
is suffi  ciently similar to the woman itself.
Even when divested of its poetic splendour (involving an eternal, unchangeable 
transcendent realm of being itself, which one is likely to imagine awash with “the 
white light of truth”), Plato’s predication-theory has fascinating features. One of 
them is, of course, the introduction of an entirely new order of objects: the eidē, 
as Plato called them, the separate forms, serving as paradeigmata: the just itself, the 
beautiful itself, the woman itself, and so on. And note, since the Φ itself is certainly 
suffi  ciently similar to the Φ itself (no matter which general term Φ we are looking 
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Thus, the beautiful itself is beautiful, the just itself is just, the human being itself 
is a human being. Indeed, since the Φ itself is not only suffi  ciently similar to the 
Φ itself, but is the only object that is maximally similar to it, in other words: the 
only object that is identical to it, the logic of Plato’s predication-theory requires 
that the Φ itself is the unique object that is maximally Φ. Thus, the beautiful itself is 
the unique object that is maximally beautiful, the just itself is the unique object 
that is maximally just – and all the other beautiful or just items are beautiful or 
just only by being more or less remote likenesses of those two eidē. – And, note, 
according to Plato’s predication-theory, the woman itself is the unique object that 
is maximally a woman.
Unfortunately, this last consequence, if nothing else, constitutes a reductio ad 
absurdum of Plato’s predication-theory. If there is such a thing as the woman itself, 
it is certainly not maximally a woman, nor even a woman. Plato himself noted 
(through the mouth of one of his dramatis personae: Parmenides) that it seems 
ridiculous to postulate that there are such things as the hair itself, or the dirt itself 
(cf. Parm., 130 c 7–8). Even if the existence of such eidē were not ridiculous, it would 
still be incontrovertibly absurd to suppose, as Plato’s predication-theory forces 
one to suppose, that no other dirt is dirt in the degree that the dirt itself is dirt.
This is a much more serious problem for Plato’s predication-theory than the 
much canvassed so-called Third-Man-Argument, which, in essence, can already 
be found in Plato’s dialogue Parmenides and might also be called “the Third-Large-
Object-Argument” (see Parm. 132 a 1 – b 2). It can be put in the following way:
The visible large objects are large in virtue of participating in a fi rst largeness. 
But this fi rst largeness is another large object. Hence the fi rst-mentioned 
large objects and this other large object are large in virtue of participating in 
a second largeness. But, again, this second largeness is another large object. 
Hence the fi rst-mentioned large objects, the second-mentioned one and this 
now apparent third large object are large because they participate in a third 
largeness. But, again, this third largeness is another large object – and so on 
ad infi nitum.
This argument tries to settle Plato’s predication-theory – not only for the 
term “large”, which is merely an example, but for each and every general term 
that can be truthfully applied in the empirical world – with an infi nite number of 
diff erent eidē without a real diff erence to them. But the argument fails. According 
to Plato’s predication-theory, the visible large objects and the fi rst largeness are 
indeed large, but not in virtue of participating in a second largeness: the visible 
(or empirical) large objects are large because they are suffi  ciently similar to the 
fi rst largeness, and the fi rst largeness is large – for the same reason: it is suffi  ciently 
similar to (since it is identical with) the fi rst largeness: the large itself. Thus, there 
is no need whatsoever to postulate any other largeness than the fi rst largeness.
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Plato’s predication-theory has, however, a very limited scope of plausible ap-
plicability. There are some cases where the theory is not obviously inadequate: 
statements like “Kate is beautiful” and “Kate is just”. But the theory is certainly 
not adequate for the statement “Kate is a woman”, or even the statement “Kate 
is a human being” – or, for that matter, for the statements “Kate is hungry” and 
“Kate is pregnant”, although these latter two statements have adjectives standing 
in predicative position just as the statements “Kate is beautiful” and “Kate is 
just” have. Moreover, Plato’s predication-theory is meant for non-relational pre-
dications only – and, in fact, I have formulated it only for non-relational predi ca-
tions. If one tries to extend it to relational predications, inadequacy looms large: 
Suppose the statement “George loves Kate” is true; but does this mean – in the 
spirit of Plato – that the ordered pair consisting of George in the fi rst place, and of 
Kate in the second, is suffi  ciently similar to love itself? Presumably not. However, 
the mystical implications of this Platonising ontological interpretation of the 
statement “George loves Kate” will surely not fail to fascinate minds that are 
receptive to such implications. The same can be said of the mystical implications 
of the Platonic ontological readings of simple predicative statements that are 
straightforwardly true and involve the term “good” as predicate, or merely the 
word “is”. Given acceptance of the classical Platonic predication-theory, it is 
possible to elevate oneself – as it were – in one leap from rather earthly matters 
right up to the transcendent Godhead Itself (though only in ontological theory). 
Especially in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages there were many minds 
that very much appreciated this asset of the Platonic predication-theory.
Inadequate treatment of relational predications is a defi ciency that is shared 
by all predication-theories prior to Frege’s. It is a defi ciency not only Plato can be 
criticised for. Nor is the long persistence of it due to Plato’s infl uence. As a matter 
of fact, its persistence is due to the infl uence of Aristotle.
In Plato’s predication-theory, the partners of predication – the ontological 
subject and the ontological predicate – are external to each other, just as a like-
ness is external to what it is a likeness of. Moreover, in Plato’s predication-theory, 
the ontological predicate is the dominant partner in predication. Aristotle, how-
ever, adheres to a paradigm of predication that is fundamentally diff erent from 
Plato’s, a paradigm that is also rather more down to earth than Plato’s. Accord-
ing to Aristotle’s paradigm, the ontological subject is the dominant part ner 
in predication, and the ontological predicate is, in predication, in some sense 
en compassed by the ontological subject, comparable to the way in which a part 
is encompassed by what it is a part of. There are signifi cant indications that Plato 
himself was moving towards some form of the mereological or, better, quasi-mereo-
logical paradigm of predication in the latter part of his philosophical career.3 But, in 
3  See Franz von Kutschera,“Parts of Forms. An Essay concerning Plato’s Parmenides”. 
Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 1 (1998): 57–74.
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the main, the origin of this paradigm must be associated with Aristotle. Mainly on 
the basis of the wide-spread reception of Aristotle’s writings since the beginning 
of the 13th century, the quasi-mereological paradigm of predication became rather 
infl uential in Western philosophy. It stayed the standard approach for just about 
six centuries. Aristotle’s predication-theory – which means: the predication-
theory which, given the data from Aristotle’s writings, is the best summative 
reconstruction of his opinions on predication – is a particular version of the 
quasi-mereological paradigm (which, indeed, has many versions); it can be put 
in the following way:
Aristotle’s predication-theory /
The quasi-mereological predication-theory with particular forms:
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the α-particular 
form of being Φ is in α.
Thus we have for example:
“Socrates is wise” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the 
Socrates-particular form of being wise is in Socrates.
“Kate is beautiful” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the 
Kate-particular form of being beautiful is in Kate.
“Kate is a woman” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the 
Kate-particular form of being a woman is in Kate.
It should be noted that a special case of the situation that the α-particular form 
of being Φ is in α is this: the α-particular form of being Φ is identical to α; this is the 
traditional Aristotelian ontological analysis of, so-called, substantial predication (as 
in “George is a man”); whereas if the α-particular form of being Φ is in α, but is not 
identical to α, we have before us the traditional Aristotelian ontological analysis 
of, so-called, non-substantial predication (as in “George is sitting”).
There are two plausible equivalents for the phrase “the α-particular form 
of being Φ is in α”, each of which, if substituted for that phrase in Aristotle’s 
predication-theory, yields a predication-theory that is plausibly equivalent to 
Aristotle’s predication-theory:
(1) Plausibly, “the α-particular form of being Φ exists” is true if, and only if, the 
α-particular form of being Φ is in α.
(2) Plausibly, “the form of being Φ is in α” is true if, and only if, the α-particular 
form of being Φ is in α.
But in fact Aristotle denies that
The quasi-mereological predication-theory with universal forms:
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the form of being 
Φ is in α,
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is true. In the Categories (Cat. 1 a 20–23; see also Cat. 3 a 11–13), he declares that 
Man – in other words: the form of being a human being – is, on the one hand, 
(truthfully) said of a subject, namely, of a particular human being, but that it 
is, on the other hand, not in any subject. This can only be taken to imply that, 
according to Aristotle, the statement “George is a human being” is true, although 
the form of being a human being is not in George, and that therefore the quasi-
mereological pre dication-theory with universal forms is not true (because it is 
counter-instantiated).
Indeed, the quasi-mereological predication-theory with universal forms can 
seem to be rather non-equivalent to the quasi-mereological predication-theory with 
particular forms, that is: to Aristotle’s predication-theory. After all, the former 
theory involves universal forms, the latter only particular ones. But scepticism 
regarding universal forms – or briefl y, universals – was certainly not Aristotle’s 
problem with the former theory: he accepted universal forms at least as secondary 
entities, whereas he did not accept Plato’s eidē, that is, Plato’s separate forms.4 His 
problem was that some universal forms are said of some subjects, but are not in 
any subject because they can exist apart from any subject they may tentatively be 
supposed to be in5 – because, as Aristotle believed at one point, they are substances: 
universal – or second – substances (in contrast to particular – or fi rst – substances).6 
However, in several places of the Metaphysics, we also fi nd Aristotle denying 
that universals – any universals – are substances.7 Now, if no universal were a 
substance for Aristotle after all, then it would seem most plausible to assume 
that, for Aristotle, any universal is said (truthfully) of a subject8 after all on the 
4  For an explicit statement of Aristotle’s acceptance of universals in contrast to Plato’s 
separate forms, see An. Post. 77 a 5–9; that passage also contains Aristotle’s defi nition of 
universal, which is this: one which can be truthfully said of many.
5  See Cat. 1 a 24–25, where Aristotle defi nes – or rather: gives a partial explication of – being 
in a subject: “In a subject I call that which exists in something, but not as a [literal] part, and cannot be 
separate from that in which it is.” [Translation U. M.] Note that the “cannot be separate from” is not 
meant by Aristotle to express a symmetrical relationship: “x cannot be separate from y” does 
not entail, for Aristotle, “y cannot be separate from x”. For he understands “x cannot be separate 
from y” in the sense of “x cannot exist apart from y”, and “y cannot be separate from x” in the 
sense of “y cannot exist apart from x”, and of course it can be – and sometimes is – the case 
that x cannot exist apart from y, while y can very well exist apart from x.
6  That this is the correct diagnosis is strongly suggested by Cat. 3 a 7–15. Regarding Aris-
totle’s asserting separability – the ability to exist apart from any supposed subject – of sub-
stances, see Met. VII, 1029 a 27–28. But note that in the same short passage Aristotle also asserts 
particularity of substances.
7  See Met. III, 1003 a 8–10; Met. VII, 1038 b 8–12, 34–37, 1041 a 3; Met. X 1053 b 16–20; Met. XIII 
1087 a 2.
8  Note that for Aristotle any universal is said truthfully of some subject (because it is by 
defi nition truthfully said of many subjects; cf. note 4).
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necessary and suffi  cient basis of its being in that subject (though in it only in a 
derivative, analogical sense) – Man and Animal being no exceptions to this rule.
In any case, vacillations in Aristotle’s writings are bound to have contributed, 
in the centuries after Aristotle and especially in the Middle Ages, to the waning 
of his distinction between universals that are not substances and are in some 
subject, and universals that are substances and are not in any subject. This 
distinction – a signifi cant residue of Platonism in Aristotle – became less and 
less important. The distinction fi nally dissolved – in favour of all universals being 
just as much in some subject as all universals are said of some subject, and in 
favour of all universals being precisely in the subjects of which they are said. 
A striking documentation of the endpoint of this development can be found in 
the commentary of Thomas Aquinas on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. There, 
Thomas simply connects a universal’s being (truthfully) predicated of a subject, 
being said of a subject, with its being in the subject of which it is predicated; no 
distinction is made in his characterisation of predication between substantial and 
non-substantial universals. Interpreting Aristotle, Thomas says (In Posteriorum 
Analyticorum I, lect. 11, n. 6):
Primo, dicit [Philosophus: Aristotle] quod tunc est universale praedicatum, cum [cum 
iterativum] non solum in quolibet est de quo praedicatur, sed et primo demonstratur 
inesse ei, de quo praedicatur.
Firstly, he [the Philosopher] says that a universal is a predicate [of something: α] 
whenever it is not only in everything of which it is predicated, but is fi rst demon-
strated to be in that [i.e., the something: α] of which it is predicated.
From this quotation, it is apparent that Thomas accepted – under the presumed 
authority of Aristotle – the quasi-mereological predication-theory with universal forms, 
because the quotation can, without much eff ort, be made to support the following 
reasoning that yields just that predication-theory:
1. The (universal) form of being Φ is (demonstrated to be) in α.
2. Hence according to Thomas [“tunc est universale praedicatum, cum … demon-
stratur inesse ei, de quo praedicatur”]: the form of being Φ is (truthfully) pre-
dicated (said) of α.
3. And hence: “Φ(α)” is true.
1'. “Φ(α)” is true.
2'. Hence: the form of being Φ is (truthfully) predicated (said) of α.
3'. Hence according to Thomas [“universale… in quolibet est de quo praedicatur”]: 
the form of being Φ is in α.
Now, as long as one assumes what Aristotle himself at some time – for some 
cases – did not assume, namely,
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that “the form of being Φ is in α” is true if, and only if, the α-particular form of 
being Φ is in α [cf. the plausible assumption (2) above],
the quasi-mereological predication-theory with universal forms will be found to 
be equivalent to the quasi-mereological predication-theory with particular forms. 
This equivalence and, in the fi rst place, the assumption on which it is based seem 
plausible without argument. One can also rather plausibly argue for them in the 
following way:
Asserting of a universal form that it is in a subject is merely a non-literal, 
analogical way of speaking. Such an assertion cannot be literally true, because 
the universal form is not a particular, whereas the subject is one. Only a parti-
cular can be literally in a particular. What is literally true in those cases where 
a universal form is truthfully but analogically said to be in a subject can only 
be this: the particularisation relative to the subject of the universal form is – 
literally – in the subject.
Thomas and his Aristotelian-minded non-nominalist contemporaries and succes-
sors – and, for that matter, Husserl, who much later in the history of ideas once 
again followed Aristotelian lines in formal ontology – would have found this argu-
ment entirely convincing.9 However, the history of ideas after the Middle Ages 
took a course that was not in keeping with the argument’s Aristotelian spirit. After 
the Middle Ages one rather tended to forget the analogical equivalence – Aristotelian 
in spirit – of the quasi-mereological predication-theory with uni versal forms to 
the quasi-mereological predication-theory with particular forms, an equivalence 
based on the assumption that the phrase “the form of being Φ is in α” is merely an 
analogical façon de parler (though no denial of universal forms is involved in that 
assumption) and that the phrase’s ultimate truth-relevant import – what it really 
says – just amounts to what is expressed by the phrase “the α-particular form of 
9  Regarding Husserl, the following passage from his lecture Phenomenological Psychology 
[Phänomenologische Psychologie] of 1925 rather strongly suggests his being ready to uphold the 
two classical quasi-mereological predication-theories simultaneously, the universalistic one 
standing, as it were, on top of the particularistic one: “One must not believe that the identity of the 
eidos [which for Husserl merely amounts to the universal] is just an exaggerating way of speaking. 
… [It is not merely the case that] every object has its in-being moment, for example, of redness, and 
[that] each of the many objects, all of which are red, has its individually own moment, but in sameness. 
Rather, one must see that the sameness is only a correlate of the identity of something that is general 
and in common [eines Allgemeinen], that can, in truth, be intuited as one and the same out of – and 
as a ‘counterpart’ of – what is individual. This identical something ‘particularises’ itself in many ways 
and can be thought, in an open infi nity, arbitrarily particularised. All of these particularisations are, 
in virtue of their relationship to what is identical, related to each other, and are accordingly called ‘each 
the same as the other’. In an extended, non-literal way of speaking, the concrete objects themselves are, 
in virtue of having eidetic particularisations in them, each called the same as the other ‘with respect to 
the red’, and are themselves, in a non-literal sense, particularisations of the something that is general 
and in common [des Allgemeinen].” – Phän. Psych., 80; translation and italics U. M.
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being Φ is in α”, or by the equivalent phrase “a particularisation of the form of 
being Φ is in α” – these phrases being taken to express the original Aristotelian 
ontological basis for predication.10 After the Middle Ages, the quasi-mereological 
predication theory with universal forms started a life of its own.
During the Renaissance, due to the infl ux of ancient Platonic texts to Italy 
af ter the fall of Constantinople in 1453, there was a signifi cant resurgence of 
Pla tonism, broadly conceived. This led to a very strong reaction against the 
Aris totelianism of the Schools and – combining with forces that emphasised 
the importance of the individual human being, of the individual human mind 
– brought about the philosophical (so-called) Enlightenment of the 17th century. 
In the fi eld of ontology, a signifi cant consequence of these revolutions was the 
following: universals turned into absolute concepts for those thinkers who, on 
the one hand, did not deny universals, like the nominalists had always done, 
and who on the other hand, Platonically and humanistically inspired, did not 
want to continue along the old mediaeval Aristotelian lines. For those thinkers, 
uni versals took on an absoluteness that traditional Aristotelians had not conceded 
to universals; it faded into the background that universals were supposed to be 
anthropogenic abstractions from particulars. At the same time, those thinkers 
em pha sised the conceptualness of universals more strongly than it had ever been: 
the affi  nity of universals to mind – which, given the absoluteness newly accorded 
to universals, could of course only be their affi  nity to a transcendent supermind. 
Mind-affi  nity had to some extent already been a characteristic of Plato’s eidē. But 
it was Plotinus who had, in late Antiquity, explicitly conceptualised the eidē by 
10  See R. E. Allen, “Substance and Predication in Aristotle’s Categories”, in Exegesis and 
Argument. Studies in Greek Philosophy Presented to Gregory Vlastos, ed. E. N. Lee et al. (Assen, 
Nether lands: van Gorcum, 1973), 367: “If Socrates is just, there is, according to the Categories, 
an instance of justice in him, an instance which is individual, numerically one, and inseparable from 
Socrates in the sense that it cannot exist apart from him.” In other words: If Socrates is just, there is 
a particularisation of the form of being just (“an individual instance of justice”) in him – and, 
clearly, that particularisation is the Socrates-particular form of being just. In general we have: 
(a) If a particularisation of the form of being Φ is in α, then the α-particular form of being Φ 
is in α (because every particularisation of the form of being Φ that is in α is identical with 
the α-particular form of being Φ). And we also have the converse: (b) If the α-particular form of 
being Φ is in α, then a particularisation of the form of being Φ is in α (because the α-particular 
form of being Φ is, if in α, a particularisation of the form of being Φ). One can derive both 
(a) and (b) on the basis of the following defi nition: the α-particular form of being Φ =Def the 
particularisation of the form of being Φ that is in α – presupposing, for all cases of α and Φ, that 
there is no more than one particularisation of the form of being Φ that is in α and that there 
is a particularisation of the form of being Φ that is in α if the particularisation of the form of being 
Φ that is in α is in α. One might object that there can easily be more than one particularisation 
of the form of being red (for example) in a subject: if a table has a red area here and a red area 
there. But one can stipulate that the phrase “[there is] a particularisation of the form of being 
Φ [that] is in α” is understood to refer, if true, to the (relatively to α) entire particularisation of 
the form of being Φ in α.
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making them denizens of the nous, while maintaining their absoluteness, their 
ontological independence from particulars. It is not unlikely that the infl uence 
of Plotinus (via Marsilio Ficino and Pico della Mirandola) helped bring about the 
described post-mediaeval developments.11
Remarkably, these developments did not necessarily endanger the acceptance 
of the quasi-mereological paradigm, that is, of precisely that paradigm of predi-
cation that Aristotle, setting himself off  from Plato, had inaugurated with his 
particular version of a quasi-mereological predication-theory. The predication-
theory of Leibniz can serve as a striking example of a syncretistic result of the 
post-mediaeval develop ments I just sketched. Leibniz was an Enlightened follower 
of the quasi-mereological paradigm and, in fact, had more sympathies with tradi-
tional Aristotelianism than most of the new intellectuals of his time. He did 
subscribe to the Scholastic slogan of praedicatum inest subjecto, but he did so in a 
new manner, refl ecting the revolution of ideas which had come about. In Section 
8 of the Discours de Métaphysique he very clearly formulates
Leibniz’s predication-theory:
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the Φ-concept is 
in the α-concept.
Obviously, the predication-making relation of in-being (inesse) in Leibniz’s pre di-
cation-theory is neither of the two relations of in-being that are invoked in the two 
previously canvassed quasi-mereological predication-theories. In fact, it is not a 
relation of in-being between the predicate and the subject at all: it is a relation 
between the predicate-concept and the subject-concept. This latter relation of in-
being, between concepts, was already at the time of Leibniz not a newly discovered 
one; it had already been familiar for a long time, and, as a matter of fact, it had 
not been clearly distinguished from the other two relations of in-being I have 
already considered.12 The common form of the statements “homo est animal” and 
“Socrates est homo” suggests that they both are simple predicative statements, 
and that therefore the relation of in-being invoked under a quasi-mereological 
theory of predication for analysing “Socrates est homo” must be the same as the 
relation of in-being invoked for analysing “homo est animal”. But in fact “homo 
est animal” is not a simple predicative statement – it is a statement of essential 
subsumption. It is true that “homo est animal” is true in virtue of the animal-
concept being in the homo-concept (or in other words: in virtue of the extension 
11  From the 17th to the 19th century, the idea of the mind-affi  nity, the concep tualness of 
universals remained present, but, progressively, it took on decidedly human proportions; for 
the initially co-present Platonic/Plotinic idea of the absoluteness of universals progressively 
disappeared – until it triumphantly re-appeared in the work of Frege.
12  For the history of in-being between concepts and its relationship to predicative in-being, 
see Uwe Meixner, “Negative Theology, Coincidentia Oppositorum, and Boolean Algebra”, Logical 
Analysis and History of Philosophy 1 (1998): 75–89.
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of the homo-concept being essentially subsumed under the extension of the animal-
concept). But it does not follow from this that the simple predicative statement 
“Socrates est homo” is, analogously, true in virtue of the homo-concept being in 
the Socrates-concept – because “homo est animal” cannot serve as a paradigm for 
“Socrates est homo”, since “homo est animal” is, contrary to appearances, not a 
simple predicative statement, but a statement that is diff erent in meaning from 
“Socrates est homo” even in the very category of meaning.
Thus, Leibniz’s predication-theory would seem to rest on a simple confusion: 
the confusion of the in-being of a universal in a particular with the in-being 
of one concept in another – if one weren’t reluctant to settle the great man 
with such a big blunder. And, indeed, there is a more favourable perspective on 
Leibniz’s predication-theory than that: Given that the quasi-mereological predi-
cation-theory with universal forms emancipated itself in post-mediaeval times 
along the lines I have de scribed (which emphasise both the absoluteness and the 
conceptualness of universals) from the quasi-mereological predication-theory with 
particular forms, the problem of how a universal predicate could be in a particular 
subject needed a new solution. In this situation, making use of the relation of in-
being between concepts must have seemed the only way to go. It was, therefore, 
not unreasonable – relatively speaking – of Leibniz to interpret “praedicatum 
inest subjecto” as “the predicate-concept is in the subject-concept”. What else 
could it mean?
Leibniz dauntlessly accepted the strange consequences of his predication-
theory: that Alexander once defeats Darius (cf. Discours de Métaphysique 8) – this 
is so because the concept of once defeating Darius is in the concept of Alexander; 
that Caesar once crosses the Rubicon – this is so because the concept of once 
crossing the Rubicon is in the concept of Caesar (cf. Discours de Métaphysique 13). But 
if this is true, then these historical truths about Caesar and Alexander, which we 
regard as contingent, are not contingent at all, but necessary truths in the strictest 
sense. We human beings learn only a posteriori and never completely – and hence 
with an almost irresistible appearance of contin gency – what is, for example, the 
content of the concept of Caesar (a consistent concept maximally rich in content, 
a notio completa). But, according to Leibniz, that concept cannot be otherwise for 
Caesar than it is (would it be otherwise, then it wouldn’t be the concept of Caesar), 
and God, according to Leibniz, knows it a priori and completely. Because Caesar 
once crosses the Rubicon, the concept of once crossing the Rubicon is contained 
in that concept of Caesar according to Leibniz’s predication-theory – we just 
saw –, hence contained in it with strict necessity, since the relation of in-being 
between concepts is a relation that holds with strict necessity whenever it holds 
at all.13 And hence it follows, again according to Leibniz’s predication-theory, that 
13  For concluding that the concept of once crossing the Rubicon is necessarily contained 
in the concept of Caesar, the reason given is, in fact, not in itself suffi  cient: “the concept 
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it is necessary in the strictest sense that Caesar once crosses the Rubicon. Leibniz 
might have noticed that we can learn to know the concept of Caesar a posteriori 
(which is the only way for us) only by coming to believe in the truth of simple 
predicative statements about Caesar – and that for our coming to believe in the 
truth of these statements the concept of Caesar is, in fact, entirely irrelevant. This 
might have given pause to Leibniz.
Like all predication-theories prior to Frege’s, Leibniz’s predication-theory is 
not adequate for relational predications, although, because it deals in concepts, 
it is not as inadequate as other theories under the quasi-mereological paradigm. 
Notice that relational predications are implicit in the very examples Leibniz 
chooses: Alexander once defeating Darius, Caesar once crossing the Rubicon. It is 
possible to assimilate relational predications to non-relational ones, along the lines 
of “Caesar once crosses the Rubicon” being read as “Caesar is a Rubicon-crosser”. 
And while it is surely absurd that an original-Aristotelian universal form of being 
a Rubicon-crosser is in Caesar – because it is absurd that an original-Aristotelian 
Caesar-particular form of being a Rubicon-crosser is in Caesar (Caesar carrying 
that thing around with him, and with it the Rubicon, it would seem) –, it is not 
absurd that the concept of being a Rubicon-crosser is in the concept of Caesar. But 
we have seen that, still, there are reasons for not accepting this as the basis that 
is appropriate for predicating being a Rubicon-crosser of Caesar.
A time came – by and large with the 19th century – when the anti-relationalist, 
substantialist conception of the world began to loosen its grip on the human 
mind, and concatenations of non-privileged, non-dominant beings (such concatenations 
may be called “states of aff airs”) instead of privileged, dominant gravitational centres 
of being (such centres may be called “substances”) began to capture the ontological 
imagination. But it took a philosopher-mathematician who had less respect – and 
probably less knowledge – of the philosophical tradition than Leibniz for progress 
to be made with regard to relational predications. Frege fi nally aban doned the 
quasi-mereological paradigm, and came up with something entirely new. There 
is no precedent or analogue in the antecedent history of ideas for
Frege’s predication-theory:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the func-
tional value of the Φ-concept for α1, …, αN is the true.
of Caesar” and “the concept of once crossing the Rubicon” must also each refer to one and 
the same (respective) concept in every possible world (compare the situation regarding the 
necessity or contingency of true identity statements). Leibniz certainly assumed the rigidity of 
the mentioned designators; but in the case of “the concept of Caesar” rigidity is, as a matter 
of fact, doubtful (the reason being this: if the concept of Caesar is the sum of all concepts 
that apply to Caesar, then that sum seems to be diff erent in diff erent possible worlds, since, 
apparently, in diff erent possible worlds diff erent concepts apply to Caesar).
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The intuitive oddness of this predication-theory decreases considerably if one 
takes into account that Frege conceived, in extension of the mathematical concept 
of a function, of concepts as functions whose functional values are the true or the 
false, and of functions, employing a chemical metaphor, as entities that are in 
themselves unsaturated, but that are saturated by their functional arguments, thus 
producing their functional values (see Frege’s 1891 paper “Funktion und Begriff ”). 
Therefore, instead of saying that
the functional value of the Φ-concept for α1, …, αN is the true,
one can, following Frege, just as well say:
the saturation of the Φ-concept by α1, …, αN is the true.
This is still somewhat odd, the main reason for this impression being Frege’s as-
sumption of a truth-object, the true, corresponding to which he has an even odder 
falsity-object, the false. But notice the fl exibility and ease Frege’s predication-
theory displays in the treatment of relational predications. What is the onto-
logical basis for the fact that the statement “George loves Kate” is true whereas 
“Kate loves George” is not true? Why, the saturation of the concept of love by 
the ordered pair that has George fi rst and Kate second is the true, whereas the 
saturation of that same concept by the inversely ordered pair is the false.
There is nothing wrong with this – except, of course, that it does not make 
contact with what it actually is that we base our judgements on when we assert 
that George loves Kate, and that Kate does not love George. Frege’s predication-
theory is a mere logical rationalisation of predication, not an account of predication 
that tries to honour the actual ontological foundation of our actual human prac-
tice of making simple predicative statements intended to be true – something 
which Aristotle’s predication-theory, and, indeed, Plato’s, did try to do, though 
not with entire success. As far as a mere logical rationalisation of predication 
goes, Frege’s theory is true and adequate, just as true and adequate as its nearest 
equivalent not employing the notion of function is, which became a standardly used 
technical tool in 20th-century model-theoretic logical semantics:
The set-theoretical theory of predication:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: α1, …, αN 
is an element of the Φ-set.14
14  Frege’s concepts (Begriff e) are extensional concepts (that is: they are identical if, and only if, 
they have the same extension); they are, therefore, one-to-one correlates of sets. Extensionality 
is not the only feature of Fregean concepts that fi ts ill with the normal concept of a concept: 
another is lack of mind-affi  nity (which is in part a consequence of their extensionality). Thus: 
Frege’s use of the word “concept” (“Begriff ”) – for the items that are really intended by him – 
still bears witness to the (above-described) emphasis on the conceptualness of universals, after 
the Middle Ages, but it does so only on the linguistic surface.
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But one certainly does not – not explicitly, and not implicitly – apply the set-theo-
retical theory of predication, or Frege’s theory, when determining, for example, 
the truth of the statement “George loves Kate”, nor would it be a good idea to 
apply these theories in the eff ort to explicate the ontological basis for the truth 
of “George loves Kate”. The same can be said of an account that – restricted to 
non-relational predications – was in use as a purely logical tool throughout the 
entire Aristotelian tradition, which I therefore call
The minimal Aristotelian theory of predication:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to the following: the 
(monadic or relational) Φ-universal is said (truth fully) of α1, …, αN.
The three last-mentioned theories (beginning with Frege’s), though true, have 
no belief-foundational and no truth-explanatory value. Though they do introduce 
onto-theoretical entities in order to account for predication – concepts, the truth-
object, sets, universals – they, in essence, just reformulate the normal expression 
of predication in technical logico-ontological terms; though they have some 
ontological content, they, in essence, just logically rationalise predication.15 They 
do so in keeping with the truth (though those who do not believe in universals or 
concepts or sets would deny this). But truth is not enough – as can easily be seen 
by a glance at what may be dubbed
The “redundancy theory” of predication:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to this: Φ(α1, …, αN).
Or by a glance at the so-called (historically not unimportant and, like the immedi-
ately preceding theory, nominalism-compatible)
“Identity theory” of predication:
“Φ(α)” is true – this amounts, “ontologically”, to this: “Φ” refers (as general 
term) to the same object that “α” refers to (as singular term).
These theories are obviously true (true for simple predicative statements as 
specifi ed at the beginning of this essay, the “identity theory” being additionally 
restricted in its range to the non-relational ones among those statements); but just 
as obviously they are not helpful at all for belief-foundation or truth-explanation.
But here, fi nally, follows a theory of predication which, like Frege’s, falls 
under the functional paradigm of predication. It is recognizably a modifi cation of 
Frege’s theory and preserves the great advantage of that theory: the capturing of 
15  If one leaves out Leibniz’s assumption of the rigidity of the designator “the concept of 
α” (for example, “the concept of Caesar”; see footnote 13), then Leibniz’s predication-theory 
turns out to be adequate also with respect to our normal modal expectations. But what it 
then off ers is merely a true logical rationalisation of non-relational predication; it has no 
belief-foundational or truth-explanatory value.
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relational predications; but it is, in contrast to Frege’s predication-theory, helpful 
for belief-foundation and truth-explanation. It is the theory I myself favour,
The fact-referring functional predication-theory:
“Φ(α1, …, αN)” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the comple-
tion of the Φ-universal by α1, …, αN is a fact, that is: an obtaining state of aff airs.
Universals that need at least in some cases two entities for completion are called 
“relations”, universals that always need only one entity for completion are called 
“properties”. Thus, we have:
“Kate is a woman” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the 
completion of the woman-property (i.e., the property of being a woman) by 
Kate is a fact, or in other words: Kate has the property of being a woman.
“George loves Kate” is true – this amounts, ontologically, to the following: the 
completion of the love-relation (i.e., the relation of love) by George, Kate is a 
fact, or in other words: George stands in the relation of love to Kate.
Facts – the states of aff airs that obtain, or are actualised – are sometimes, in their 
factuality, a product purely of social conventions; but normally they are not. 
In any case, facts that are merely made up of universals and particulars – in a 
manner that I have here merely hinted at, using the metaphor of completion16 – 
are the primary objects of human objective cognition, not particulars as such 
and not universals as such. To particulars and universals we come in cognition 
only via states of aff airs that involve them, and foremost via facts that involve 
them. Because facts that are merely made up of universals and particulars are 
the primary objects of human objective cognition, the fact-referring functional 
predication-theory is helpful for founding belief in the truth, and for ontologically 
explaining the truth, of simple predicative state ments. We apply this theory 
implicitly when we judge that a simple predicative statement is true, and we do 
well to apply this theory explicitly when we seek to explain, from the ontological 
point of view, why – that is, on what ontological basis – a simple predicative 
statement is true.
16  The full theory is presented non-metaphorically in Uwe Meixner, The Theory of Ontic 
Modalities (Heusenstamm bei Frankfurt a. M.: Ontos, 2006).
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